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1 Introduction
A controversial issue in the study of tax competition is whether it is desirable for
countries or regions to agree not to provide preferential treatment to different forms
of capital. The common view is that without such restrictions, countries will aggres-
sively compete for capital that is relatively mobile across different locations, resulting
in taxes that are far below their efficient level. By eliminating such preferential treat-
ment, no capital will be taxed at very low rates, because doing so would sacrifice
too much tax revenue from the relatively immobile capital. But this solution is not
without cost: in an attempt to attract mobile capital, governments can be expected
to reduce the common tax rate below the tax at which relatively immobile would
be taxed in the preferential case. In an important paper, Keen (2001) analyzes this
tradeoff using a model with two tax bases that exhibit different degrees of mobil-
ity and finds that governments raise more revenue when the more mobile tax base
gets preferential treatment. On the other hand, Haupt and Peters (2005) show that
preferential regimes lead to lower tax revenues by simply adding a preference for in-
vesting in the home country to the Keen (2001) framework. Surprisingly, this minor
assumption changes completely the desirability of one regime versus the other.
Attacking the issue from a slightly different angle, Janeba and Peters (1999) show
that the elimination of preferential treatment leads to higher total tax revenues in
a context where there exist multiple arbitrary identifiable tax bases. Other papers
have generalized and extended these results, including Wilson (2005), Konrad (2007),
and Marceau, Mongrain and Wilson (2009). They all consider an environment with
two tax bases that exogenously differ in their degrees of mobility. A general insight
appears to be that if one of the two tax bases becomes perfectly mobile, so that the
region with the lowest tax rate always attracts it, then the non-preferential regime
raises more revenue. Both Keen (2001) and Haupt and Peters (2005) arguments in
favor of preferential treatment are based on a model where the two tax bases exhibit
finite, but different, elasticities with respect to the difference in the regions’ tax
rates. They cannot analyze the case where one of the tax base elasticities approaches
infinity, because pure-strategy equilibria may not exist. Wilson (2005) and Marceau,
Mongrain and Wilson (2010) consider mixed-strategy equilibria, and obtain results
supporting Janeba and Peters (1999). Most closely related to what we do is Janeba
and Smart (2003), who offer a more balance view on discrimination, stating conditions
where one regime is preferable to the other. The main difference is in the definition of
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the tax bases. Instead of assuming exogenously defined tax bases, we look at tax bases
in the original context of Keen (2001) and Haupt and Peters (2005), where origin is
the only identifiable characteristic. Note that Bucovetsky and Haufler (2008) also
offer a balance view, but require an additional lair of decision making relative to the
organizational structure of the firms.
In the current paper, we present a case for the non-preferential or the preferential
regime that does not require either tax base elasticity to be large, not to have intrinsic
exogenous differences. Moreover, whereas the previous literature is silent about the
magnitude of the difference in tax revenue between the two regimes, our results sug-
gest that the difference can be quite large. Indeed, replacing preferential treatment
with non-preferential treatment can nearly doubles tax revenue in our basic model
with symmetric regions, and moving costs uniformly distributed. Obviously, the par-
ticular distribution moving costs takes influences the magnitude by which one regime
dominates the other. If there are enough firms with low moving costs preferential
regimes can generate higher tax revenue like in Keen (2001).
These results are based on a different view of the meaning of preferential tax treat-
ment. One view in this literature is that governments distinguish between different
types of capital, or firms according to their mobility characteristics. But other liter-
atures on optimal taxation in an open economy emphasize the difficulties involved in
making such distinctions. Preferential treatment must be based on observable charac-
teristics of firms that may be only loosely associated with mobility differences.1 Thus,
preferential tax regimes often consist of the foreign-owned portion of a tax base being
taxed at a lower rate than the domestic-owned portion, a behavior that is also labeled
“discrimination.” Some countries – e.g. Canada and the US – have signed mutually
advantageous tax treaties, which would be jeopardized if one or the other actor were
to start discriminating. And the prohibition of the asymmetric treatment of foreign
and domestic firms has been included in treaties in the EU and the OECD. Both the
OECD and the EU are active in trying to reduce the extent of discrimination among
their members.2
1Hong and Smart (2010) assume that all firms must face the same statutory tax rates, and they
analyze the use of tax havens to achieve desirable differences in effective marginal tax rates. Hagen,
Osmundsen, and Schjelderup (1998) work with a model where a firm’s mobility is related to the size
of its investment, in which case it is optimal to impose a nonlinear tax on investment.
2On this, see OECD (1998).
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We model this distinction between foreign and domestic firms by considering a
two-region world in which each region initially possesses a stock of “domestic firms”
which must incur a cost to relocate to the other region, whereas the “foreign firm”
that it seeks to attract are the other region’s domestic firms. Although both foreign
and domestic firms face the same distribution of moving costs, this does not mean
that the tax elasticities of the foreign and domestic tax bases are the same, because
these elasticities depend on how many firms of each type are located in each regions.
In fact, the foreign tax base elasticity goes to infinity as the excess of the domestic
tax rate over the foreign tax rate goes to zero. In particular, there is a large incentive
to lower the tax on foreign firms enough to attract at least a small number of foreign
firms since before the tax rates are lowered there are no current foreign firms in the
region. We thus generate a preferential tax system where foreign firms are taxed
more lightly than domestic firms with no intrinsic difference in elasticities. Our
model also allows us to identify another negative impact associated with preferential
tax regimes. With a unique tax rate on domestic and foreign firms, movement of firms
is unidirectional; firms move from the low tax region to the high tax region. In fact,
with symmetric regions, no firms move in equilibrium. In a preferential tax regime
however, both regions set a lower tax rate on foreign capital, and so there exist a
bidirectional movement of firms, even in the symmetric case. Since firms move only
for fiscal reasons, preferential regimes lead to more wasteful reallocation costs.
The plan of this paper is as follows. First, we consider a simple example where
all firms face a single moving cost. This example quickly produces a huge difference
between the revenue raised under the non-preferential and preferential regimes. Next,
we develop the basic model, in which moving costs are uniformly distributed. Then
we add the zero-moving-cost firms to the analysis. Finally, we consider the dynamic
model.
2 Basic Model
The economy contains two regions, indexed by j ∈ {1, 2}. In each region, there are
Nj domestic firms, with N1 ≥ N2. For simplicity, we assume that N1 = 1, and
we define n ∈]0, 1] as an index of size heterogeneity between the two regions, where
n = N2/N1. If both regions have the same size, then n = 1; heterogeneity grows
as n diminishes. All firms have the possibility of moving, but face different moving
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costs c. Moving costs are distributed between zero and one according to a cumulative
distribution function F (c), and the corresponding density distribution function f(c).
Each firm generates γ ≥ 1 of before-tax profits for it owners, regardless of where it
is located. Profits are taxed where they are earned. Thus, any movement of firms
from one region to another is based on tax considerations and will therefore result in
the expenditure of socially wasteful moving costs. To guarantee a unique and pure
strategy equilibrium, we assume that f ′(c)/f(c) ∈ [1/γ, 1/γ]. This is to say that the
distribution function displays no large peaks or valleys. As a source of example, we
will often use the function F (c) = (c+a)
αaα
(1+a)α−aα , with α > 0 and a ∈ [0, 1]. First, note
that F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1. Also, f(c) = α (c+a)
α−1
(1+a)α−aα , which is increasing when
α > 1, and decreasing when α < 1. The uniform distribution is a special case where
α = 1. Moreover, the condition stated above implies that α ∈ [1− a/γ, 1 + a/γ].
The general timing of events is as follows. First, regions choose their tax rates,
with the goal of maximizing tax revenue, and all firms draw a moving cost. Then,
firms chose whether to move or remain in their initial location. Finally, taxes are
collected.
2.1 Non-Preferential Regime
Under a non-preferential regime, each region i ∈ {1, 2} sets a unique tax rate ti for
all firms, regardless of whether the firm is already in the region (domestic firms),
or just moved to the region (foreign firms). For any given t1 > t2, a firm in region
1 stays in region 1 as long as [1 − t1]γ ≥ [1 − t2]γ − c. Thus, all firms with c >
[t1 − t2]γ stay in region 1, and so the tax revenue from all domestic firms is define as
[1− F (γ[t1 − t2])] γt1. Since no firms move from region 2 to region 1 when t1 > t2,
this quantity represents the total tax revenue for region 1. If t1 ≤ t2, tax revenue
from domestic firms is given by γt1. Firms in region 2 move to region 1 whenever
c < [t2 − t1]γ, generating tax revenue of nF (γ[t2 − t1]) γt1 for region 1. Total tax
revenue in region 1, denoted R1(t1, t2), is given by:
R1(t1, t2) =
[
1− F (γ[t1 − t2])
]
γt1 if t1 ≥ t2;
γt1 + nF (γ[t2 − t1]) γt1 if t1 < t2. (1)
5
The best-response function t1(t2) is defined as:
t1(t2) =
1−F (γ[t1−t2])
γf(γ[t1−t2]) if t1 ≥ t2;
1+nF (γ[t2−t1])
γnf(γ[t2−t1]) if t1 < t2. (2)
Lemma 1: Whenever f ′(c)/f(c) ∈ [−1/γ, 1/γ], the best response function for region
1 is monotonically upward slopping, with a slope less than one.
Proof of Lemma 1: The slope of the best response function is given by:
∂t1(t2)
∂t2
= f(γ[t1−t2])+γt1f
′(γ[t1−t2])
2f(γ[t1−t2])+γt1f ′(γ[t1−t2]) if t1 ≥ t2;
f(γ[t2−t1])−γt1f ′(γ[t2−t1])
2f(γ[t2−t1])−γt1f ′(γ[t2−t1]) if t1 < t2. (3)
To guarantee that the second order conditions are satisfied, the denominator must
be positive. For any value of t1 ≥ t2, the best response function is then positively
sloped, only if the numerator is also positive. Note that any condition guaranteeing
that the numerator is positive also implies that the denominator will be positive.
Consequently, it must be the case that t1f
′(c)/f(c) > −1/γ. This condition is always
satisfied whenever f ′(c) > 0. When f ′(c) < 0, it is sufficient (but not necessary) that
the condition been satisfied at t1 = 1. Consequently, a sufficient condition for the
reaction function to be positively sloped is that f ′(c)/f(c) > −1/γ. Similarly, we can
show that the reaction function is positively sloped for the case where t1 < t2 when
f ′(c)/f(c) < 1/γ. It easy to see that if the reaction function is upward sloping, then
the slope is less than one. QED
For future use, denote by i = − tiBi ∂Bi∂ti the elasticity of the tax base Bi with respect
to tax ti. The tax base elasticity 1 for region 1 is given by:
1 = γt1
f(γ[t1−t2])
1−F (γ[t1−t2]) if t1 ≥ t2;
γt1
nf(γ[t2−t1])
1+nF (γ[t1−t2]) if t1 < t2. (4)
Tax revenues from region 2 are defined in a similar way:
R2(t1, t2) = n [1− F (γ[t2 − t1])] γt2 if t2 ≥ t1;
nγt2 + F (γ[t1 − t2]) γt2 if t2 < t1. (5)
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The best-response function for region 2 is given by:
t2(t1) =
1−F (γ[t2−t1])
γf(γ[t2−t1]) if t2 ≥ t1;
n+F (γ[t1−t2])
γf(γ[t1−t2]) if t2 < t1. (6)
Lemma 1 also applies for region 2’s best response function, and so the function has a
positive slope whenever f ′(c)/f(c) ∈ [−1/γ, 1/γ]. We can again define the tax base
elasticity 2 for region 2 as:
2 = γt2
f(γ[t2−t1])
1−F (γ[t2−t1]) if t2 ≥ t1;
γt2
f(γ[t1−t2])
n+F (γ[t1−t2]) if t2 < t1. (7)
Proposition 1: Under a non-preferential regime, if n = 1, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium where t1 = t2 =
1
γf(0)
.
Proof of Proposition 1: Given Lemma, 1 both reaction functions must cross only
once. Solving equations (??) and (??) reveals that t1 = t2. QED
Corollary to Proposition 1: Under a non-preferential regime with moving costs
uniformly distributed, whenever n = 1, there exist an unique Nash equilibrium where
t1 = t2 =
1
γ
.
An increase in either γ or f(0) lead to a reduction in tax rates. Starting from t1 = t2,
it is easy to see that the tax base elasticities are increasing in both γ and f(0). As
γ increases, firms become more mobile, since the average moving cost becomes small
relative to the fiscal benefit of moving. Similarly, if f(0) is large, “many firms are
ready to move at no cost. Note also that the elasticity of the tax base with respect to
tax rate is the same regardless of whether it is created by attracting more new firms
or retaining more existing firms. Figure 1 illustrates the case where F (c) is a uniform
distribution.
Whenever n < 1, the smallest region is more aggressive at lowering its tax rate.
This confirms many similar results in the literature on tax competition like in Bu-
covetsky (1991). In our context however, small is defined as the region with the least
amount of domestic firms, or less immobile capital following the interpretation of
Marceau, Mongrain and Wilson (2010). The next proposition relates the equilibrium
tax rates to differences in regional size.
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Figure 1: Symmetric equilibrium with uniform distribution when n = 1.
Proposition 2: Under a non-preferential regime, whenever n < 1, there exist a
unique Nash equilibrium where t1(n) > t2(n).
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we prove by contradiction that in any equilibrium,
whenever n < 1, it must be the case that t1 > t2. Imagine that a combination of tax
rates t2 > t1 solves both best response functions. From (??) and (??), we could then
show that:
1− F (γ[t2 − t1])
t2
=
1 + nF (γ[t2 − t1])
nt1
.
Re-writing the equation above, we would get that:
t1
t2
=
1 + nF (γ[t2 − t1])
n− nF (γ[t2 − t1]) > 1.
Since n < 1, it must be the case that the left hand side of the equation above is
greater than 1. Consequently, we must have that t1 > t2, which is a contradiction.
The same contradiction does not apply for value of t1 > t2. Moreover, when t2 = 0,
then t1(0) > 0. We also know that
∂t1(t2)
∂t2
< 1 < 1/∂t2(t1)
∂t1
, so consequently there exist
a unique Nash equilibrium where t1(n) > t2(n). QED
Corollary to Proposition 2: Under a non-preferential regime with moving costs
uniformly distributed, whenever n < 1, there exist a unique Nash equilibrium where
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t1(n) =
2+n
3γ
and t2(n) =
1+2n
3γ
.
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Figure 2: Asymmetric equilibrium with uniform distribution when n < 1
See Figure 2 for a representation of the asymmetric Nash equilibrium when moving
costs are uniformly distributed. We can explain the differences in tax rates, by looking
at the elasticities for both regions. From the first order conditions, we can easily show
that in equilibrium, both elasticities are equalized (1 = 2). When size heterogeneity
increases (lower n), the small region faces a more elastic tax base, and so sets a
much lower tax rate. Having fewer domestic firms gives the small region a strategic
advantage. Attracting new firms has a bigger proportional impact on tax revenue
for the small region. Moreover, as shown in Proposition 3, more heterogeneity in
size leads to lower tax rate for both regions. More heterogeneity makes the smaller
region more aggressive, and since tax rates are strategic complements, both regions
set lower tax rates. As heterogeneity increases the difference in tax rates, as defined
as ∆t = t1 − t2, also grows. This implies that more heterogeneity also leads to more
movement of firms.
Proposition 3: More heterogeneity in size (lower n) leads to a lower tax rate for both
Regions. Moreover, the difference in tax rates ∆t = t1− t2 increases as heterogeneity
increases.
Proof of Proposition 3: For any value of t1 > t2, the first order condition for region
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1 is independent of n. Using the best response function for region 2 – equation (??)
–, we can show that
∂t2(t1)
∂n
= 1
2f(γ[t2−t1])+γt2f ′(γ[t2−t1]) > 0 if t1 ≥ t2. (8)
Since t1(t2) is increasing in t2, it implies that both t1 and t2 are both increasing with
n. We can define ∆t = t1 − t2 as
∆t =
1− F (γ∆t)
γf(γ∆t)
− n+ F (γ∆t)
γf(γ∆t)
(9)
Comparative static reveals that:
∂∆t
∂n
= − 1/γ
3f(γ∆t) + γ∆tf ′(γ∆t)
. (10)
The expression above is always negative when f ′(c)/f(c) ∈ [−1/γ, 1/γ], so a decrease
in n leads to an increase in ∆t. QED
We now look at tax revenue. With symmetric regions (n = 1), total tax revenue for
both regions are given by Ri = 1/f(0) for the general case, and simply Ri = 1 for
the uniform specification. When regions are of different sizes, total tax revenues are
given by:
R1 =
[
1− F (γ[t1 − t2])
]2
f (γ[t1 − t2]) , R2 =
[
n+F (γ[t1−t2])
]2
f(γ[t1−t2]) .
With uniform moving costs, tax revenue are given by R1 = (2 + n)
2/9 and R2 =
(1 + 2n)2/9. More size heterogeneity has two important effects on tax revenue. The
first one, which we label as the tax rate effect, represent the fact that more size
heterogeneity pushes both regions to set lower tax rates. As the small region gets
smaller, it faces higher tax elasticity and become more aggressive. The large region
has no other choices that to also lower its own tax rate. The second force at play
is what we refer to as the mobility effect. Firms seeking lower tax rates influence
both regions tax bases by moving. This effect is also referred in the literature as
tax base importing/exporting. As n decreases, ∆t = t1 − t2 increases, and so more
firms are moving from region 1 to region 2. The large region always suffers from an
increase in size heterogeneity. More heterogeneity implies lower tax rates, but also
implies that more firms move away from region 1. A lower tax rate and a smaller base
definitively lead to lower tax revenue. For the smaller region however, the two effects
are working in opposite directions. More heterogeneity leads to an increase in region
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2’s tax base. An increase in tax revenue can then happen if ∂∆t/∂n is sufficiently
negative. To get meaningful conditions on whether heterogeneity lead to more or
less tax revenue for region 2, we must however, look at an alternative measure of tax
revenue. Since a reduction in n implies a smaller amount of domestic firms in region
2 (n = 1/n), changing n is consequently a bias exercise because it reduces the total
tax base available in the economy.
To better understand the negative impact of tax competition, we constructed a
series of measures that relates actual tax revenue to the potential tax revenue. Denote
by ri = Ri/Niγ, the ratio of tax revenue to potential tax revenue in region i. For
the uniform distribution, we get that r1 = (2 + n)
2/9γ and r2 = (1 + 2n)
2/9nγ. As
expected, r1 increases with a n. The same applies for the general case. On the other
hand, more heterogeneity in size (smaller n) has an ambiguous effect on relative tax
revenues for the small region. For the uniform case, an increase in heterogeneity leads
to lower tax revenue relative to potential tax revenue if n > 1/2, but leads to higher
relative tax revenue when n < 1/2. A similar, but less elegant, condition also exist
form the general case.
It is also useful to look at total tax revenue for both regions relative to total
potential tax revenue in the economy; this measure is denoted by r = (R1 +R2)/(1 +
n)γ. In a non-preferential tax regime, r = (2+n)
2+(1+2n)2
9(1+n)γ
for the uniform case. An
increase in heterogeneity (smaller n) leads to lower total tax revenue. The tax rate
effect leads to less tax revenue as both regions set lower tax rate. The mobility effects
simply cancel each other out, as the loss for region 1 is a gain region 2. However, there
exist a third effect when we look at total tax revenue, which we call the composition
effect. Because firms move from region 1 to region 2, and because region 2s tax rate
is lower than region 1s tax rate, total tax revenue decreases.
The last measure we look at is total moving costs relative to potential tax revenue.
In a non-preferential regime, firms only move in one direction. The difference in tax
payments given by Proposition 2 determines the share of region 1s domestic firms
that choose to move to region 2. A total of F (γ[t1 − t2]) firms choose to move, which
adds up to (1 − n)/3 in the uniform case. These firms incur wasteful moving costs
without any gains in productivity. The sum of moving cost generated is
∫ 1−n
3
0
cf(c)dc
which equal to (1−n)
2
18
in the uniform case. Total moving costs relative to potential
tax revenue for the uniform case is then given by ρ = (1−n)2/18(1+n)γ. With more
heterogeneity (lower n), more firms move, and so moving cost increases.
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2.2 Preferential Regime
Under a preferential tax regime, each region i taxes its existing domestic firms and
newly arrived foreign firms at different rates, ti for domestic firms and τi for the foreign
firms. When t1 > τ2, a firm in region 1 will stay in region 1 if [1− τ1]γ ≥ [1− t2]γ− c,
or c > [τ1 − t2]γ. As a result, the tax revenue obtained from all domestic firms is
given by [1− F (γ[t1 − τ2])] γt1. On the other hand, if t1 ≤ τ2, all domestic firms stay,
yielding tax revenue equal to γt1. In addition, firms in region 2 will move to region
1 whenever c < [t2− τ1]γ, generating additional tax revenue of nF (γ[t2 − τ1]) γτ1 for
region 1. Total tax revenue in region 1, R1(t1, τ1, t2, τ2), is given by:
R1 = [1− F (γ[t1 − τ2])] γt1 if t1 > τ2and τ1 ≥ t2;
[1− F (γ[t1 − τ2])] γt1 + nF (γ[t2 − τ1]) γτ1 if t1 > τ2and τ1 < t2;
γt1 if t1 ≤ τ2and τ1 ≥ t2;
γt1 + nF (γ[t2 − τ1]) γτ1 if t1 ≤ τ2and τ1 < t2. (11)
The best-response functions for t1 and τ1 are given by:
t1(τ2) =
1−F (γ[t1−τ2])
γf(γ[t1−τ2]) if t1 > τ2;
τ2 if t1 ≤ τ2 ≤ 1;
1 if t1 ≤ τ2 > 1. (12)
τ1(t2) =
F (γ[t2−τ1])
γf(γ[t2−τ1]) if τ1 < t2;
0 if τ1 ≥ t2. (13)
We start by looking at the domestic tax rate t1. For any given t1 > τ2, region 1
losses some domestic firms to region 2. Consequently, region 1 faces an elastic tax
bases, and so the reaction function – first line of equation (??) – directly comes from
the first-order condition on t1. When t1 ≤ τ2, region 1’s tax base becomes perfectly
inelastic as region 1 retains all its firms. Region 1 would like to set 100% tax rate on
domestic firms. However, this cannot be done unless region’s 2 tax rate is also equal
to 100%. Consequently, t1 must equal τ2. Similarly, if τ1 < t2, some firms move from
region 2 to region 1, and so region 1 faces a foreign elastic tax base. This generates
the reaction function given by equation (??). When τ1 ≥ t2, no firms move to region
1, so any τ1 yields zero tax revenue.
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Denote by di (ti) = −(ti/Bdi )(∂Bdi /∂ti) the elasticity of the domestic tax base Bdi
with respect to tax ti, and 
f
i (τi) = −(τi/Bfi )(∂Bfi /∂τi) the elasticity of the foreign
tax base Bfi with respect to tax τi. The tax base elasticities for region 1 are given by:
d1(t1) = γt1
f(γ[t1−τ2])
1−F (γ[t1−τ2]) if t1 > τ2;
0 if t1 < τ2. (14)
f1(τ1) = γτ1
f(γ[t2−τ1])
F (γ[t2−τ1]) if τ1 < t2;
0 if τ1 > t2. (15)
We now look at region 2’s tax revenues maximization problem. Tax revenues for
region 2 are given by:
R2 = n [1− F (γ[t2 − τ1])] γt2 if t2 > τ1and τ2 ≥ t1;
n [1− F (γ[t2 − τ1])] γt2 + F (γ[t1 − τ2]) γτ2 if t2 > τ1and τ2 < t1;
nγt2 if t2 ≤ τ1and τ2 ≥ t1;
nγt2 + F (γ[t1 − τ2]) γτ2 if t2 ≤ τ1and τ2 < t1. (16)
The best-response functions t2(τ1) and τ2(t1) are given by:
t2(τ1) =
1−F (γ[t2−τ1])
γf(γ[t2−τ1]) if t2 > τ1;
τ1 if t2 ≤ τ1 ≤ 1;
1 if t2 ≤ τ1 > 1; (17)
τ2(t1) =
F (γ[t1−τ2])
γf(γ[t1−τ2]) if τ2 < t1;
0 if τ2 ≥ t1. (18)
As we can see from these best response functions, there exists an equilibrium set of
taxes {t1, τ2} arising from both regions competing for firms located in region 1. Sim-
ilarly, there exists an equilibrium set of taxes {τ1, t2} resulting from the competition
for firms located in region 2. The next proposition identifies these taxes.
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Proposition 4: Under a preferential regime, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
where domestic tax rates t1 = t2 are greater than the foreign tax rates τ1 = τ2.
Proof of Proposition 4: Given the first order conditions no solution can be found
for value of t1 < τ2 or t2 < τ1. Consequently, the domestic tax rate for region 1, and
the foreign tax rate for region 2 are such that t1 > τ2, and the slopes of the best
response function are given by:
∂t1(τ2)
∂τ2
= f(γ[t1(τ2)−τ2])+γt1(τ2)f
′(γ[t1(τ2)−τ2])
2f(γ[t1(τ2)−τ2])+γt1(τ2)f ′(γ[t1(τ2)−t2]) ; (19)
∂τ2(t1)
∂t1
= f(γ[t1(τ2)−τ2])−γτ2(t1)f
′(γ[t1(τ2)−τ2])
2f(γ[t1(τ2)−τ2])−τ2(t1)f ′(γ[t1(τ2)−t2]) . (20)
The best response for domestic tax rate by region 1 is upward sloping with a slope less
than one for the same condition f ′(c)/f(c) ∈ [−1/γ, 1/γ] stated in the non-preferential
regime section. QED
Corollary to Proposition 4: Under a preferential regime with moving costs uni-
formly distributed, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium where t1 = t2 =
2
3γ
and
τ1 = τ2 =
1
3γ
.
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Figure 3: Preferential taxes t1 and τ2 for uniform moving costs.
14
As we see in Figure 3, a region always sets a lower tax rate on foreign firms compared
to domestic firms, independently of N1 and N2. Preferential tax treatment is always
used to attract foreign firms. To better understand this result, we can examine the
tax-base elasticities. In equilibrium, the domestic and foreign tax base elasticities
are positive, and are equalized. Imagine that τ1 was to be smaller than t2, but only
by a very small amount. Region 1 would then attract almost no firms from region
2. Reducing τ1 further would then change its foreign tax base by a large proportion.
This implies a large foreign tax base elasticity f (τ1). On the other hand, region 2
would lose few domestic firms. Increasing its tax rate on domestic firms would only
reduce its domestic tax base by a small proportion. This implies a small domestic
tax base elasticity d(t2). As the gap in tax rate increases, both elasticities converges
to the point where there are equal, and τi ≤ ti.
Two important differences arise under the preferential tax treatment. First, het-
erogeneity does not matter anymore. Both regions fight independently for the tax
base generated by firm in region 1 and for the tax base generated by firms in region
2. Competition for domestic tax rate t1 and for foreign tax rate τ2 only depends on
the size of the domestic tax base in region 1. Competition for t2 and τ1 only depends
on the number of domestic firms in region 2. Second, firms move in both directions.
Firms in region 1 with low moving cost seek low foreign tax rate in region 2, and at
the same time, firms in region 2 with low moving cost seek low foreign tax rate in
region 1. For the uniform case, a total of Ni/3 firms move from each region i, creating
a sum of moving costs equal to (1 + n)
∫ 1/3
0
cdc = 1+n
18
. Total moving cost relative
to potential tax revenue is given by ρ = 1/18γ. With this bi-directional movement
of firms, the preferential regime always generates more wasteful moving cost than
the non-preferential regime. We will now look at other differences between the two
regimes by looking at tax revenue for both regions:
R1 =
[
1− F (γ[t1 − τ2])
]2
f (γ[t1 − τ2]) + n
[
F (γ[t2 − τ1])
]2
f (γ[t2 − τ1]) , R2 = n
[
1−F (γ[t2−τ1])
]2
f(γ[t2−τ1]) +
[
F (γ[t1−τ2])
]2
f(γ[t1−τ2]) .
For the uniform case, a simple calculations yield tax revenues of R1 = (4 + n)/9
for region 1 and R2 = (4n + 1)/9 for region 2. Two obvious observations can be
made under the uniform case. First, tax revenues are decreasing with heterogeneity.
The reason is simple, smaller n implies less taxable income because there are less
firms in the economy. All other effects are absent, since tax rates are independent
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of heterogeneity. In fact the same applies for any general distribution of moving
costs. As we already know, however, only looking at change in total revenue can
be misleading because of the effect changes on n as on potential taxable income. If
we instead look at tax revenues relative to potential tax revenue (r1 = R1/γ and
r2 = R2/nγ), we find that r1 is decreasing with heterogeneity, while r2 is increasing
with heterogeneity. With fewer firms in region 2 (n < 1), region 1 losses more firms
than it gains, but region 2 attracts more firms that it looses. Total tax revenue
divided by potential tax revenue r = [R1 +R2]/(1 + n)γ is obviously independent of
heterogeneity because tax rate are independent of heterogeneity.
The second important observation in the uniform case is that tax revenues are
lower as compare to the non-preferential regime for all value of n > 0. If the two
regions have the same size (n = 1) for example, each collected four-ninths of the rev-
enue obtained under the non-preferential regime, representing a substantial revenue
loss. This however, is not always the case when we move away from the uniform
distribution of moving cost. In fact, a preferential tax regime may generate larger tax
revenues as stated by Proposition 5 bellow.
Proposition 5: With homogenous region (n = 1), the preferential tax regime gen-
erates more tax revenues if the distribution of moving costs features a sufficiently
decreasing density distribution function. More precisely, if and only if:
f (γ[t− τ ])
f(0)
< [1− F (γ[t− τ ])]2 + F (γ[t− τ ])2 .
A sufficient condition for the preferential tax regime to generate more tax revenues
is that:
f(0)
f (γ[t− τ ]) ≥ 2.
Proof of Proposition 5: The tax revenues for region 1under a preferential tax
regime are given by:
R1 =
[
[1− F (γ[t1 − τ2])]2 + nF (γ[t1 − τ2])2
f (γ[t1 − τ2])
]
. (21)
Tax revenues R1 are larger than tax revenues under a non-preferential tax regime
R1 = 1/f(0), only if the condition stated in Proposition 5 is satisfied. Since the
right hand side of the condition is less one, it must be the case that f (γ[t1 − τ2]) <
f(0), and so the density distribution function must be sufficiently decreasing. Since,
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[1− F (γ[t1 − τ2])]2 + F (γ[t1 − τ2])2 ≥ 1/2, a sufficient sufficient condition is that
f(0)
f(γ[t1−τ2]) ≥ 2. QED
Note that the uniform distribution of moving costs definitively does not satisfy this
condition. This explains why the preferential tax regime generates less tax revenues
for this distribution of moving costs. With the distribution function F (c) = (c+a)
αaα
(1+a)α−aα
we specified earlier, any value of α such that aα−1 > 2γ leads to a superiority of
the preferential regime in term of generating tax revenues. Since a < 1, a low value
of α is required, meaning that the density function must be sufficiently decreasing.
When the distribution of moving costs features a decreasing density, many firms are
easily attracted, even for small differences in tax rates between two regions. Home bias
behaviours when making investment decisions as described in Haupt and Peters (2005)
would correspond to a distribution function which does not satisfied this condition,
as few firms would be willing to move under this assumption. Many other reasons
can account for distribution functions that would either satisfied or not satisfy the
condition stated in Proposition 5. Consequently, this model can nest both Keen
(2001) and Haupt and Peters (2005) models.
Lastly, we can comment on the effect of size heterogeneity on the relative merit of
both types of tax regimes. For the large region, an increase in size heterogeneity favors
the preferential tax regime in term of generating tax revenues. More heterogeneity
reduces tax revenues in a non-preferential regime because of both the tax rate and
the mobility effects. However, since tax rates are independent of n in the preferential
regime, such regime is more likely to be preferred by the larger region for high degree
of heterogeneity. Intuitively, the strategic advantage the small region has against
the large region in the non-preferential regime comes from the different in size. This
strategic advantage disappears under the preferential regime. The same is not always
true for the small region. Because the mobility effect favors the small region in a
preferential tax regime, more heterogeneity can make the non-preferential tax regime
more attractive for the small region. Intuitively, the small region likes to compete
with a unique tax rate against a large region who is reluctant to lower it tax rate due
to the size of its domestic tax base. Overall, since mobility effects are a zero sum
game, more heterogeneity globally favors the preferential regime.
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3 Perfectly Mobile Firms
We now extend our model to include a mass of firms with zero moving cost in both
regions. Moving costs are now distributed between zero and one in the following way:
in each region, a proportion λ of firms face a zero moving cost, and a proportion
1−λ have a moving cost distributed between zero and one according to a cumulative
distribution function F (c), and a density f(c). As a source of example, we will use
the same functional form proposed in the previous section. We will look at both tax
regimes the same way we did in the last section.
3.1 Non-Preferential Regime
Under a non-preferential regime, each region chooses a unique tax rate on all firms,
regardless of whether the firms are already located in the region, or just moved in
to the region. For any given t1 > t2, a firm in region 1 stays in region 1 as long
as (1 − t1)γ ≥ (1 − t2)γ − c; this implies that all firms with zero moving cost also
moves to region 2. All firms with c > (t1 − t2)γ will stay in region 1. The tax
revenue from all domestic firms is (1− λ)[1− F (γ[t1 − t2])]γt1. Since no firm moves
from region 2 to region 1, it represents total tax revenues for region 1. If t1 ≤ t2,
tax revenue from domestic firms is simply γt1. Firms in region 2 move to region 1
whenever c < (t2 − t1)γ, including all firms with a zero moving cost. This generates
tax revenues of λnγt1 + (1 − λ)nF (γ[t2 − t1])γt1 for region 1. Total tax revenues in
region 1, R1(t1, t2), are given by
R1(t1, t2) = (1− λ)[1− F (γ[t1 − t2])]γt1 if t1 > t2
γt1 + λnγt1 + (1− λ)nF (γ[t2 − t1])γt1 if t1 ≤ t2 (22)
The best-response function for region 1 can be defined by:
t1(t2) =
1−F (γ[t1−t2])
γf(γ[t1−t2]) if t1 > t2
(1+λn)/n(1−λ)+F (γ[t2−t1])
γf(γ[t2−t1]) if t1 < t2
t1 = t2 − ι if t1 = t2, (23)
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where ι > 0 is as small a possible. Similarly, tax revenues from region 2 are defined
as:
R2(t1, t2) = (1− λ)n [1− F (γ[t2 − t1])] γt2 if t2 > t1
nγt2 + λγt2 + (1− λ)F (γ[t1 − t2]) γt2 if t2 ≤ t1 (24)
The best-response function for region 2 is given by:
t2(t1) =
1−F (γ[t2−t1])
γf(γ[t2−t1]) if t2 > t1
(n+λ)/(1−λ)+F (γ[t1−t2])
γf(γ[t1−t2]) if t2 < t1
t2 = t1 − ι if t2 = t1, (25)
Both reaction functions are once again non-decreasing when f ′(c)/f(c) ∈ [1/γ, 1/γ].
One important difference when some firms have a zero moving cost is that a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium no longer exists in some cases. For example, when t1 = t2,
both regions would benefit from lowering their own tax rate by a small amount. If a
region was to do so, it would have a marginal impact on the domestic tax base, but
the region would instantly attract a proportion λ for the foreign firms. For a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium to exist, N1 must be sufficiently greater than N2. The next
proposition describes its properties.
Proposition 6: Under a non-preferential regime, there exist a unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium where t1 > t2 if and only if n < 1− 2 [λ+ (1− λ)F (θ[t1 − t2])]. It
is sufficient that n < 1− 2λ for this condition to be satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 6: When n = 1, there exist no pure strategy equilibrium.
Consequently, n must be smaller than one for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist.
As in Proposition 2, we can show that when n < 1, it is impossible to havet1 < t2.
The solution to both reaction functions where t1 > t2 is only possible if n < 1 −
2 [λ+ (1− λ)F (θ[t1 − t2])].
Corollary to Proposition 6: Under a non-preferential regime with moving costs
uniformly distributed, there exist a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium where t1 =
2−λ+n
3γ(1−λ) and t2 =
1+λ+2n
3γ(1−λ) if and only if n < 1− 2λ.
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A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only exists when there is enough difference in sizes
between the two regions, and when there are few perfectly-mobile firms. Heterogeneity
in size is needed to get sufficient differences in tax rates. With a large difference in tax
rates, region 1 losses a significant amount of tax revenue from its domestic firms when
it undercut region 2’s tax rate. A low number of perfectly-mobile firms is also needed.
With few perfectly-mobile firms, region 1 enjoys a small increase in tax revenue when
it undercut region 2s tax rate. If the stated condition is not satisfied, there will be
no pure strategy equilibrium, but there will be some mixed strategy Nash equilibria
similar to the ones found in Marceau, Mongrain and Wilson (2010).
Heterogeneity in size has the same effect as in the last section. More heterogeneous
regions leads to lower tax rates for both regions because it makes the small region
more aggressive, and tax rate are strategic complement. It is very interesting to see
that more firms with a zero tax moving cost leads to higher tax rates for both regions.
Having more firms with a zero moving cost acts as a disciplining device for the small
region. In any pure strategy equilibrium, the small region always attracts all perfectly
mobile firms. This implies that the tax base elasticity for the small region is lower
when there are more perfectly mobile firms, leading to lower tax rates.
Assuming that the condition for the existence of a the pure strategy equilibrium
is satisfied, tax revenues for the two regions are given by R1 = (2− λ+ n)2/9(1− λ)
and R2 = (1 + λ+ 2n)
2/9(1− λ) for the uniform case, and by
R1 = (1− λ)
[
1− F (γ[t1 − t2])
]2
f (γ[t1 − t2]) , R2 = (1− λ)
[
(n+λ)/(1−λ)+F (γ[t1−t2])
]2
f(γ[t1−t2]) .
for the general case. When moving costs are uniformly distributed, tax revenues
relative to potential total tax revenues in both regions are given by r1 = (2 − λ +
n)2/9(1 − λ)γ and r2 = (1 + λ + 2n)2/9(1 − λ)nγ. Economy wide tax revenues
relative to total potential tax revenues is given by r = [(2 − λ + n)2 + (1 + λ +
2n)2]/9(1 − λ)(1 + n)γ. Finally, total moving costs relative to potential revenue is
given by ρ = (1− n)2/18(1− λ)(1 + n)γ.
The small region always gains tax revenue when λ increases (r2 is increasing in
λ). With more perfectly mobile firms, tax rates are higher, and the small region
attracts more firms. For the large region, having more perfectly mobile firm has an
ambiguous effect. Tax revenue increases because of the higher tax rates, but at the
same time the region losses more firms. With the uniform distribution, tax revenue
are increasing with λ, but this is not a general result. Total tax revenue may increases
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or decrease with λ. Higher tax rates stimulate tax revenues. At the same time, more
firms move from region 1 with a higher tax rate to region 2 with the smaller tax rates.
This movement of firms lowers tax revenue. In the uniform case, the effect of having
higher tax rates dominates. Adding more firms with a zero moving cost does not
directly change total moving costs since those moving costs are nil, but it reduces the
tax gap. A smaller tax gap implies that fewer firms with a positive moving cost are
actually moving.
3.2 Preferential Regime
Under a preferential regime, we define ti and τi as region i’s tax rate on domestic and
on foreign firms, respectively. When t1 > τ2, a firm in region 1 stays in region 1 if
(1 − τ1)γ ≥ (1 − t2)γ − c. Thus, only the firms with c > (τ1 − t2)γ stay in region
1. Tax revenues from all domestic firms are given by (1− λ)[1− F (γ[t1 − τ2])]γt1. If
t1 ≤ τ2, then all domestic firms stay in region 1, and tax revenues from those firms are
simply γt1. Firms in region 2 move to region 1 whenever c < (t2 − τ1)γ, generating
tax revenues of λnγτ1 + (1− λ)n[F (γ[t2− τ1])]γτ1 for region 1. Total tax revenues in
region 1, R1(t1, τ1, t2, τ2), are given by:
R1 = (1− λ)[1− F (γ[t1 − τ2])]γt1 if t1 > τ2 & τ1 ≥ t2
(1− λ)[1− F (γ[t1 − τ2])]γt1 + λnγτ1 + (1− λ)n[F (γ[t2 − τ1])]γτ1 if t1 > τ2 & τ1 < t2
γt1 if t1 ≤ τ2 & τ1 ≥ t2
γt1 + λnγτ1 + (1− λ)n[F (γ[t2 − τ1])]γτ1 if t1 ≤ τ2 & τ1 < t2
(26)
The best-response functions for t1(τ2) and τ1(t1) are given by:
t1(τ2) =
1−F (γ[t1−τ2])
γf(γ[t1−τ2]) if t1 > τ2
τ2 − ι if t1 ≤ τ2, (27)
τ1(t2) =
λ/(1−λ)+F (γ[t2−τ1])
γf(γ[t2−τ1]) if τ1 < t2
t2 − ι if t1 = t2. (28)
21
Tax revenues for region 2 are given by:
R2 = (1− λ)n [1− F (γ[t2 − τ1])] γt2 if t2 > τ1and τ2 ≥ t1;
(1− λ)n [1− F (γ[t2 − τ1])] γt2 + λγτ2 + (1− λ)F (γ[t1 − τ2]) γτ2 if t2 > τ1and τ2 < t1;
nγt2 if t2 ≤ τ1and τ2 ≥ t1;
nγt2 + λγτ2 + (1− λ)F (γ[t1 − τ2]) γτ2 if t2 ≤ τ1and τ2 < t1.
(29)
The best-response functions t2(τ1) and τ2(t1) are given by:
t2(τ1) =
1−F (γ[t2−τ1])
γf(γ[t2−τ1]) if t2 > τ1;
τ1 if t2 ≤ τ1 ≤ 1;
1 if t2 ≤ τ1 > 1; (30)
τ2(t1) =
λ/(1−λ)+F (γ[t1−τ2])
γf(γ[t1−τ2]) if τ2 < t1;
0 if τ2 ≥ t1. (31)
As in the previous section, there exist an equilibrium set of taxes, {t1, τ2}, result-
ing from the competition for firms located in region 1, and a set of taxes, {τ1, t2},
resulting from the competition for capital located in region 2. Using the best-response
functions, we obtain Proposition 7.
Proposition 7: Under a preferential regime, there exist a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium where t1 = t2 > τ1 = τ2 if and only if λ <
1−2F (γ[t−τ ])
2−2F (γ[t1−τ2]) .
Proof of Proposition 7: The poof of Proposition 7 is identical to the one from
Proposition 3. However, we must ensure that ti > τi. Using the first order conditions
on t and τ we can show that ti > τi if and only if λ <
1−2F (γ[t−τ ])
2−2F (γ[t1−τ2]) . QED
Corolarry to Proposition 7: Under a preferential tax regime with uniformly dis-
tributed moving costs , there exist a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium where
t1 = t2 =
2+λ/(1−λ)
3γ
and τ1 = τ2 =
1+2λ/(1−λ)
3γ
, if and only if λ < 1/2.
If it exists, the pure strategy equilibrium with zero moving costs firms mirrors the
one described in the previous section. However, if there are too many zero moving cost
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firms, so if there is too much perfectly mobile capital in other words, pure strategy
equilibrium may not exist, and again only mixed strategy equilibria like in Marceau,
Mongrain and Wilson (2011) would be present. As oppose to what happen under
a non-preferential tax regime, where the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
requires sufficient heterogeneity between regions, heterogeneity is not needed here.
What is needed for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is a sufficiently large
tax differential so that a region who looses its perfectly mobile firms has no incentives
to lower its tax rate. As we learned in the previous section, domestic firms are always
taxed at a higher rate than the foreign firms in a preferential tax regime, creating the
needed gap. Heterogeneity plays no role because it has no impact on tax rates.
Having more zero moving cost firms allows both regions to set higher tax rates.
More zero moving cost firms lowers the foreign tax base elasticity, pushing foreign
tax rate upward. Since foreign and domestic tax rates are strategic complements,
domestic tax rate also increases. This is true for any distribution F (c). Tax revenues
for both regions are given by:
R1 = (1− λ)
([
1− F (γ[t1 − τ2])
]2
f (γ[t1 − τ2]) + n
[
λ/(1− λ) + F (γ[t2 − τ1])
]2
f (γ[t2 − τ1])
)
,
R2 = (1− λ)
(
n
[
1− F (γ[t2 − τ1)
]2
f (γ[t2 − τ1]) +
[
λ/(1− λ) + F (γ[t1 − τ2])
]2
f (γ[t1 − τ2])
)
.
With uniform moving costs, tax revenues relative to potential tax revenues in both
regions are given by r1 = [(2 − λ)2 + n(1 + λ)2]/9(1 − λ)γ and r2 = [n(2 − λ)2 +
(1 + λ)2]/9(1 − λ)nγ respectively. Having more firms with a zero moving costs acts
as a discipline device limiting tax competition, this stimulates tax revenues for both
regions. With uniform moving costs, this effect dominates all other effects, and so tax
revenues increases with λ. However, a countervailing force is at play. Any one firm
with a zero moving cost benefits from a preferential fiscal treatment by moving, and
is taxed at the lower rates τ < t. This reduces tax revenue for both regions. With
the general formulation of moving costs, tax revenues may increase or decrease for
both regions. In the non-preferential regime, firms only moved from the large region
to the small region, so the small region always benefited from higher λ. This is no
longer the case with preferential tax regime.
Economy wide tax revenues relative to potential tax revenues in the uniform case
are given by r = [(2 − λ)2 + (1 + λ)2]/9(1 − λ)γ. Because tax rates increase with
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λ, aggregate tax revenues tend to increase with λ. At the same time, more firms
are taxed at a preferential rate. Having more zero moving cost firms can either
stimulate or limit total tax revenues. In the uniform case, it stimulates tax total
revenue. The ratio of total moving costs relative to potential tax revenues is given
by ρ = (1− 2λ)2/18(1− λ)2γ3. Adding more firms with a zero moving cost does not
directly change total moving costs since those moving costs are nil, but it reduces the
tax gap. A smaller tax gap implies that fewer firms with a positive moving cost are
actually moving.
With uniformly distributed moving costs, the non-preferential tax regime always
generates more tax revenues for both regions, as it was the case in the absence of
perfectly mobile capital. With a general cost distribution function, no system sys-
tematically dominates the other. However, meaningful conditions are much harder
to construct because the simplicity of the symmetric case (n = 1) can no longer be
exploited.
4 Conclusion
Two important extensions would be worth exploring. First, we could add some
perfectly-mobile firms to the model. Intuition might suggest that their existence
leads to lower taxes, as regions compete more aggressively to attract them. But also,
taxes could actually be higher in both the preferential and non-preferential cases.
Since the smaller region would attract these mobile firms, the resulting increase in
its tax base would imply a lower tax base elasticity for its foreign firms, providing it
with an incentive to tax these firms at a higher rate.
A second extension would be to undertake a dynamic analysis, where each region
recognizes that the new firms that it attracts this period will generate tax revenue in
future periods. Under the preferential regime, this means that setting taxes on new
foreign firms at low enough rates to attract them this period will enable the region
to tax them at higher rates in future periods. Using the assumptions from our static
model about the distribution of moving costs, the non-preferential regime may yield
substantially more revenue than the preferential regime.
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